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The newly-adopted Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSMD) will fundamentally 
reshape EU copyright law. Among its most controversial offerings is Article 17, the so-called “value gap” 
provision, aimed at solving the alleged mismatch between the value that online content-sharing platforms 
extract from creative content and the revenue returned to the copyright-holders. This article argues that the 
new rules are misguided, misconceiving the real problems afflicting modern copyright. These are the 
proliferation of copyright infringement online in general – not only through content-sharing platforms – 
and the current piecemeal harmonisation of the rules on the liability of the intermediaries whose services 
are used to access and disseminate copyright-protected content. The current outdated and fragmented EU 
legal framework is ill-equipped to address these problems. Instead, it creates legal uncertainty for users and 
intermediaries in the online environment, while also failing to compensate creators fairly. The new rules 
will not change this. The article examines the pre-DSMD acquis and explains how a better solution than 
Article 17 can be found in two key actions: (a) the introduction of a harmonised EU framework for 
accessory liability for third party copyright infringement; and (b) the adoption of an alternative 
compensation system for right-holders covering non-commercial direct copyright use by the end-users of 
certain online platforms. 
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A. Introduction 
 
In September 2016, the European Commission published its proposal for a new Directive on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market (DSMD).1 The proposal was controversial from the start. Almost every step of 
the legislative process was the subject of intense lobbying and debate, up until the final text was approved 
in 2019.2 
 
Among the more controversial offerings of the Directive is Article 17 (13 in earlier drafts) on the “[u]se of 
protected content by online content-sharing service providers”. Although neither the Explanatory 
Memorandum nor the Impact Assessment to the Directive explicitly use the term, it is widely accepted that 
the main driver behind Article 17 is what has become known as the “value gap”, i.e. the alleged mismatch 
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between the value that online sharing platforms extract from creative content and the revenue returned to 
the copyright-holders.  
 
Article 17 regulates “online content-sharing service providers” (OCSSPs). These are defined as service 
providers with a profit-making purpose that store and give the public access to large numbers of copyright 
works uploaded by their users, which they organise and promote. This applies not only to well-known 
platforms, like YouTube, Facebook or Vimeo, but also any type of user-upload platform that fits this broad 
definition and is not expressly excluded.3 The provision changes existing law by stating that such platforms 
carry out acts of communication to the public when they give access to works uploaded by their users.4 
These platforms are therefore made primarily liable for their users’ uploads. Under the new Directive, 
OCSSPs no longer benefit in relation to such uploads from the hosting safe harbour, which was previously 
available to many of them.5  
 
Platforms that fall under this regime have two options. First, they may obtain authorisation from the right-
holders by concluding a licensing agreement for the content uploaded by users.6 This is problematic, as it’s 
nearly impossible to envision a scenario where a platform of this type can obtain all the required licences 
for the potentially millions of works uploaded by their users.7 The second option provided is therefore likely 
to be heavily relied upon. According to this, platforms can avoid liability if they meet a number of 
cumulative conditions/requirements. They must demonstrate that they have: (a) made best efforts to obtain 
an authorisation; (b) made best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works for which the right-
holders have provided them with the relevant and necessary information; and (c) acted expeditiously, 
subsequent to a notice by the right-holders, to take down or disable access to infringing content and made 
best efforts to prevent its future upload.8  
 
Many commentators argued during the legislative process that the obligations introduced by Article 17 
would be incompatible with pre-existing EU directives, as well as with the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights,9 as interpreted by the CJEU.10 In order to ensure the unavailability of works and escape liability, 
platforms will be obliged to examine all uploaded content to ensure that it does not infringe copyright in 
works listed by right-holders and remove that which does. Given the immense amounts of content that 
many platforms store, in practice this will involve the use of automatic content recognition technologies, 
otherwise known as “upload filters”. Critics point out that, whether done manually or through automated 
tools, such checks will require general monitoring, an outcome incompatible with earlier law11 and which 
the directive explicitly rejects.12 Crucially, in its case law, the CJEU has also stated that broad filtering 
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measures would be in violation of platforms’ freedom to conduct a business, as well as users’ rights to the 
protection of personal data and freedom of expression.13  
 
To avoid the negative effects of such obligations, the provision requires platforms to ensure filters will not 
prevent the availability of works which do not infringe copyright. This would include uses covered by an 
exception or limitation, such as those for the protection of quotation, criticism, review, caricature, parody 
or pastiche.14 Unfortunately, existing content recognition technologies are incapable of accommodating 
such dynamic and context-specific exceptions. Human review is unlikely to help much, unless undertaken 
by judges. The result will be that many otherwise lawful uses will be blocked.15 Although the DSMD does 
require that platforms implement complaint and redress mechanisms for users, these are unlikely to mitigate 
these effects in any meaningful way, since these mechanisms are typically ineffective.16 Article 17 also 
incorporates some safeguards for providers’ freedom to conduct a business, in the form of factors to be 
taken into account in determining whether an OCSSP has complied with its obligations.17 Whether these 
are sufficient will be a question for the courts. Finally, while the Directive does explicitly state that it should 
not lead to the unlawful processing of personal data,18 it is not obvious how the filtering Article 17 
incentivises can avoid that outcome.19  
 
In addition to these shortcomings, this article suggests that Article 17 suffers from a more fundamental 
weakness: it is based on a misconception of the real problem afflicting EU copyright law, i.e. the 
proliferation of copyright infringement online in general, not only through Web 2.0 hosts. This problem is 
compounded by an increasingly outdated EU copyright framework that allows infringing end-users to hide 
behind their online anonymity, while failing to provide any mechanism for the compensation or 
remuneration of right-holders for the infringements these users commit.20 Faced with this impasse, right-
holders have shifted their focus to internet intermediaries. Yet, while the CJEU’s recent case law has waded 
into the tricky area of intermediary liability, no complete system of rules determining what obligations 
intermediaries have to prevent or remove online copyright infringement currently exists at the EU level.  
 
Absent a more stable legal basis, targeted superstructure initiatives such as the new directive are set up for 
failure. At best they can improve a small part of a larger problem and at worst introduce significant legal 
uncertainty. If EU copyright law is to be reformed, it is on the above crucial weak spots that proposals 
should focus. This article proposes an alternative approach to Article 17, intended to better target these 
weak spots. Based on our pre-existing research into the areas of intermediary liability and copyright 
compensation systems, we advance a two-pronged proposal, consisting of: (a) the introduction of a 
harmonised EU framework for accessory liability for third party copyright infringement; and (b) the 
adoption of an alternative compensation system for right-holders covering non-commercial direct copyright 
use by the end-users of certain online platforms.21 As we explain, this solution avoids the difficulties 
encountered by Article 17 DSMD, while successfully targeting the copyright framework’s real failings.  
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The article progresses in the following manner. Part B begins with a descriptive account of the relevant pre-
DSMD EU law on copyright, in particular the Information Society Directive (InfoSoc Directive)22 and the 
E-Commerce Directive (ECD),23 as interpreted by the CJEU. Part C moves on to the article’s normative 
offering: our proposed alternative approach to copyright reform. Here, each of the proposal’s two 
components is analysed in detail. Part D concludes on a brief pragmatic assessment.  
B. Identifying the Real Problems: Two Crucial Weaknesses of the Current Copyright Acquis 
 
Before a solution to the problem of online copyright infringement can be devised, a proper understanding 
of the current legal framework governing the issue is necessary. Such an understanding can enable the 
identification of that framework’s failings: if online copyright infringement is a problem, in what ways is 
the current law struggling to address this? Once the law’s weak points have been located, targeted solutions 
can be deployed. This section examines the pre-DSMD EU copyright framework from two perspectives: 
firstly, the legal position of individual infringers and, secondly, the legal position of the intermediaries 
whose services such infringers use. In this way, the inadequacies of the current rules’ response to the two 
main contributors to modern online copyright infringement can be identified.  
I. The Precarious Position of Individual Users 
 
The first crucial weakness of the current acquis is found in the precarious position in which it places 
individual users. The everyday practices of such users on the Internet involve a diverse array of acts, 
including browsing, downloading, streaming, stream ripping, uploading, and hyperlinking. These activities 
may involve making copies of and disseminating copyright-protected content online and, as a result, trigger 
the application of the exclusive rights of reproduction and communication to the public, as harmonised by 
Articles 2 and 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. 
 
In particular, following CJEU decisions, the right of reproduction applies to the online consumption, 
manipulation and dissemination of content by end-users, as these activities require the making of digital 
copies.24 This broad interpretation may be questioned, with commentators suggesting that it is inappropriate 
for the digital age.25 As concerns the right of communication to the public, the Court has developed a 
complex set of criteria.26 In simple terms, a use will amount to a communication to the public if it meets 
two cumulative conditions. It must constitute: (a) an “act of communication”, that is made to (b) “the 
public”. To this effect, the Court carries out an “individualised assessment” of several “autonomous and 
interdependent” criteria in light of the circumstances of each case.27 Among others, the Court looks at the 
“role of the user”, his “deliberate/intentional intervention” and whether the communication at stake is 
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through a “separate”/“specific” technical means or directed at a “new public”.28 Cumulative audiences 
amount to a “public”, as long as they are not “insignificant”. Finally, whether or not the “communication” 
is of a profit-making nature also has to be considered.29 These criteria do not always neatly apply to the 
online use of content, a problem compounded by the fact that the legal status of certain acts may depend on 
the imposition of contractual and technical restrictions by right-holders.30 For example, is not currently 
clear whether sharing a work with a restricted group of “friends” on a social network would amount to a 
communication to the public. Moreover, as the CJEU expands and contracts the scope of the right from 
case to case, greater flexibility might be injected into judicial deliberations, but end-users themselves are 
placed on legal quicksand. 
  
Ultimately, as a result of the EU legal framework on reproduction and communication to the public, a 
significant number of individuals’ online activities either prompt the application of exclusive rights or are 
legally ambiguous. In principle, the reproduction right applies to browsing, downloading, the reception of 
streams from unauthorised sources, stream ripping, certain uploads and the making of digital adaptations. 
The right of communication to the public is relevant for the online transmission of streams, uploading to 
publicly accessible websites and many types of hyperlinking.31  
  
Of course, even where exclusive rights apply, a use may nevertheless be allowed by the exceptions set out 
in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive. This, however, is not generous to users, as it excludes rights in 
software and databases, defines most exceptions as optional for Member States,32 and allows limitations to 
be overridden by contract, as well as the use of technological protection measures.33 The EU case law on 
exceptions mostly follows the canon of strict interpretation, meaning that their scope is narrowly defined.34 
The result is that existing exceptions provide little coverage for the online practices of users.  
 
Finally, little relief can be found in the legal regulation of digital adaptations. At EU level, there is no 
harmonised right of adaptation. National law may contain a separate right of adaptation, as well as 
exceptions providing breathing space for the making and dissemination of derivative works.35 But such 
space can only be limited, for two reasons. First, the broad interpretation of the harmonised exclusive right 
of reproduction by the CJEU causes it to extend to most literal and non-literal reproductions that form part 
of the derivative work. Second, where that is the case, the narrow interpretation of the harmonised 
exceptions (quotation, incidental inclusion, and parody) excludes their application to many digital 
adaptations.36 Thus, to create such a space, legislative reform at EU level is needed, e.g. through the creation 
of a specific exception for user-generated content.37 
 
                                                                        
28 JP Quintais, JP, ‘Untangling the Hyperlinking Web: In Search of the Online Right of Communication to the Public’ (2018) 21(5-6) J. World 
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interpretation to be a common view point in international norms) and M Senftleben, ‘Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models’ (2013) 4 
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35 PB Hugenholtz and M Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities (Institute for Information Law/VU Centre for Law and 
Governance 2011).  
36 For an extensive analysis see J-P Trialle and others, ‘Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society (the “InfoSoc Directive”) (Directorate-General for the Internal Market and Services’ (European Commission, 2013).  
37 See JP Quintais, ‘Rethinking Normal Exploitation: Enabling Online Limitations in EU Copyright Law’ 41 (2017) 6 AMI: Tijdschrift voor 
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As a result of the above, the current framework leaves individual users in a precarious legal position, while 
seemingly also conflicting with the objectives of EU copyright law.38 It does not promote legal certainty, 
the smooth functioning of the internal market, the development of new technologies, or foster the circulation 
of culture. It erodes the legitimacy of copyright law by divorcing it from social norms. Finally, assuming 
that a significant number of online infringments by individuals is unenforceable – either de facto or due to 
limits imposed by fundamental rights39 – the expansion of exclusivity in the online environment fails to 
ensure an appropriate remuneration to right-holders for the (unauthorised) use of works and, consequently, 
an adequate level of protection:40 right-holders may be protected, but only in theory. 
II. The Partial Harmonisation of Intermediary Liability 
 
Most online copyright infringements are not performed by persons relying exclusively on their own 
technical capabilities. Instead, they use the services of internet intermediaries. In addition to that of 
individual users therefore, a second significant question concerns the liability of the providers of such 
services. When should they be held liable for copyright infringements committed by end-users employing 
their services? At the moment, no complete EU system on intermediary liability in copyright exists.  
 
Prior to the adoption of the new directive, the most relevant EU provisions were the so-called “safe 
harbours”. These are conditional immunities introduced in the E-Commerce Directive (ECD) that shield 
intermediaries from liability under specific circumstances. While the safe harbours don’t harmonise 
intermediary liability per se, they do set limits to its application. For the purposes of this article, the hosting 
safe harbour of Article 14 ECD is especially relevant. This provides protection to intermediaries that store 
information posted by third parties, as long as the host doesn’t have actual or constructive knowledge that 
the information is illegal or, upon obtaining such knowledge, removes it.41 Many of Article 17’s OCSSPs 
had been presumed to be covered by the provision.  
 
Complementing the safe harbours, Article 15(1) ECD prohibits Member States from imposing on protected 
providers general obligations to monitor the information that they transmit or store or to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity. In combination with Article 14, this results in the effective 
introduction into EU law of what is known as a “notice-and-takedown” (NTD) regime, i.e. a system that 
obliges hosting providers to remove infringements after receiving notification of their illegality or lose the 
safe harbour.  
 
Importantly, even if a platform enjoys safe harbour protection, this will not necessarily mean that no action 
can be taken against it. Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive instructs Members States to ensure that 
injunctions remain available against intermediaries whose services are used by third parties to infringe 
copyright or related rights. The general monitoring prohibition of Article 15(1) ECD sets limits here as 
                                                                        
38 On these objectives as interpreted by the CJEU, see the empirical analysis of M Favale and others, ‘Is There A EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An 
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39 The argument is developed in detail in JP Quintais, Copyright in the Age of Online Access: Alternative Compensation Systems in EU Law (Kluwer 
Law International 2017). See also C Geiger, ‘Challenges for the Enforcement of Copyright in the Online World: Time for a New Approach’ in P 
Torremans (ed.), Research Handbook on the Cross-Border Enforcement of Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2014) 704 and C Geiger, ‘Statutory 
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Workings of the European Court of Justice’ (2016) 79 The Modern L. Rev. 31, 65–68. On the disconnect between EU copyright law and social 
norms, see PB Hugenholtz and M Senftleben, ‘Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities’ (Institute for Information Law/VU Centre for Law 
and Governance 2011) 26-28. 
41 To benefit from the safe harbour, the host must additionally not have had authority or control over the end-user in the posting of the contested 





well. The provision has been interpreted by the CJEU as excluding injunctions obliging intermediaries to 
monitor actively all the data they transmit or store.42  
 
The CJEU has also approached the issue of injunctions against intermediaries through the lens of 
fundamental rights. The Court has held that such injunctions involve a clash between opposing fundamental 
rights. According to consistent case law, such clashes should be resolved by the Member States by striking 
a “fair balance” between all relevant fundamental rights.43 As a general rule, in cases of copyright and 
related rights enforcement, a tripartite schematic focusing on copyright holders, intermediaries and internet 
users can be identified. For the first, the right to intellectual property (Article 17(2) Charter) is at stake. 
Depending on the circumstances, in the application of injunctions this may collide with the intermediaries’ 
freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 Charter). In addition, the rights of end-users to the protection of 
their personal data (Article 8 Charter), their private life (Article 7 Charter) and their freedom to receive and 
impart information (Article 11 Charter) must be taken into account. The Court has found that filtering 
obligations would not strike a ‘fair balance’ between all relevant fundamental rights.44 On the other hand, 
more moderate requests are more likely to be granted.45 
 
Further than the above, the only harmonised source of intermediary liability rules in EU law can be found 
in the regular provisions on primary copyright infringement. Naturally, these may be applied to hold 
Internet intermediaries liable for the infringements they perform in the same way as any other person. Yet, 
in recent case law, the CJEU has reshaped them to do something more: hold defendants liable for 
infringements performed by others. In this way, their bearing on intermediary liability has significantly 
increased. 
 
The relevant jurisprudence has so far focused on the right of communication to the public of Article 3 of 
the InfoSoc Directive. The CJEU’s aforementioned “individualised” approach to this right has allowed it 
to gradually relax its early finding that an “act of communication” requires an “indispensable” intervention 
on the part of the defendant, such that the relevant public would not otherwise be able to enjoy the work.46 
Instead, the Court now accepts that it is sufficient that the public would be able to do so only with 
difficulty.47 The consequences of this expansion are controlled through the requirement that the relevant 
public be a “new” one. In the recent hyperlinking decision of GS Media, the notion of “new public” was 
connected with the defendant’s knowledge of the infringement or profit derived from it.48  
  
This evolution has proved significant for intermediary liability. In June 2017, 10 months after the 
publication of the Commission’s proposal for the new directive, GS Media’s knowledge-based logic was 
applied in Ziggo to find that the peer-to-peer file-sharing website The Pirate Bay reaches a “new public” 
and thus communicates works to the public.49 In this way, it was confirmed that the mental element GS 
Media introduced is not intended to apply exclusively to hyperlinking, but has a wider applicability. The 
results could be particularly important for the host service providers targeted by Article 17. After all, The 
Pirate Bay is in effect a host, albeit of torrent files and magnet links, as opposed to content files – and if 
                                                                        
42 Case C-360/10, SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012) ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, [34] and Case C-484/14, McFadden, (15 September 2016) 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:689, [87]. 
43 See Case C-275/06, Promusicae (29 January 2008) ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, [68]. 
44 Case C-360/10, SABAM v Netlog, (16 February 2012) ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, [25], [52].  
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links can constitute infringements, the difference between the two is minimal. Moreover, knowingly hosting 
a link to infringing content is arguably a more tenuous connection than knowingly hosting the infringing 
content itself. As commentators have observed, in this way, the CJEU appears to have pre-empted the EU 
legislator and introduced its own positively-stated rules on intermediary liability.50  
 
Notably, the CJEU’s approach rests on a curious blending of the notions of primary and accessory liability 
in copyright. Primary infringement occurs where a person engages in a copyright infringement themselves. 
Accessory infringement occurs where one person participates in – i.e. acts as an accessory to – a copyright 
infringement performed by another. While knowledge is traditionally a hallmark of accessory liability in 
copyright law,51 primary infringement has always been understood to be a strict liability tort.52 
  
Obfuscating the division between the two areas can be tricky. Most obviously, the consistent requirement 
of a mental element would mean turning primary copyright infringement into a fault-based tort. It is 
however doubtful that that was the CJEU’s intention. What is far more likely is that the CJEU will, in 
future, rely on the variable normative power it has assigned to the multiple interdependent criteria on which 
it establishes communication to the public to conclude that the condition of knowledge is only necessary 
where the infringement depends on the existence of a prior infringement by another. That is to say, 
knowledge will matter only in cases where the defendant was acting as an accessory, as opposed to the 
primary perpetrator.53 
  
Questions however remain: what type of involvement in the infringement of another is sufficient? What is 
the appropriate mental element? Whether the exceptions and limitations of Article 5 of the InfoSoc 
Directive will apply to parties whose infringement depends on their knowledge of the infringement is also 
unclear. More importantly, although it represents a definite step in the right direction, the CJEU’s approach 
stops short of the full harmonisation of accessory liability in copyright. If an intermediary cannot reasonably 
be found to be communicating to the public, assuming no safe harbour applies, a pan-EU solution will 
remain elusive: national rules on accessory liability might result in different outcomes for the same 
defendant in different Member States.  
 
Article 17 does not address these problems. For one thing, it only applies to OCSSPs. Furthermore, its 
relationship to the CJEU case law on communication to the public is unclear. The new provision states that 
OCSSPs communicate the uploads of their users to the public. But what does this mean for the CJEU’s 
careful interpretation of this right? Do the Court’s “autonomous and interdependent” criteria remain 
relevant or have they now been made redundant, whether for OCSSPs or generally? The new rules create 
more questions than they answer.54  
C. A Better Way Forward: A Two-pronged Approach to Online Infringement 
 
As the above analysis reveals, the current EU law on copyright infringement has major weaknesses. It 
provides little breathing space for individuals to use protected content with legal certainty, emphasises 
exclusivity and enforcement over remuneration and has evolved into a complex legal maze on the liability 
of online platforms. The EU legislator’s “value gap”-driven and OCSSP-focused solution will not solve 
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these problems. It is likely incompatible with existing directives and with the Charter, increases legal 
uncertainty, and fails to take into proper account the interests of creators.55  
 
This article argues that copyright reform should instead focus on the weaknesses identified above in the 
current EU law on copyright infringement. It recommends two mechanisms for overcoming these 
weaknesses and achieving a real improvement of EU copyright law for all involved stakeholders. These 
would be complementary and intended to support each other through their parallel implementation. The 
first is the adoption of a truly harmonised EU framework for accessory liability for copyright infringement. 
The second is the introduction of an alternative compensation system for right-holders covering non-
commercial direct copyright infringement by end-users online, in particular in the context of user-upload 
platforms.  
 
Below, we examine how this two-pronged approach would work and what each of these mechanisms would 
contribute to the ultimate solution to the problem of online copyright infringement. Subsequently, the 
anticipated effect of their combined adoption on the operation of EU copyright law is briefly discussed.  
I. Harmonisation of accessory copyright liability 
 
As Section B.II. suggests, one of the most prominent gaps in the edifice of modern European copyright law 
is the lack of a harmonised regime for accessory liability.56 In view of the ubiquity of intermediation in 
internet-based communications, this omission has become increasingly glaring. The rules of accessory 
liability are those suitable to govern questions of intermediary liability, i.e. when an intermediary should 
be held liable for the infringements of third parties (most commonly, its users). The lack of a harmonised 
regime has therefore resulted in the fragmentation of the legal framework in an area that is particularly 
relevant to online infringement. Introducing a harmonised solution would overcome this fragmentation and 
create a sound legal basis for addressing such infringement. Once adopted, this solution could also be 
applied to the online sharing platforms implicated in the “value gap” controversy, thus providing a more 
theoretically consistent solution to their liability than that offered by Article 17.  
 
As an added advantage, such harmonisation would also help achieve greater clarity with regard to the 
European rules of primary liability in copyright, by decisively alleviating the pressures for their over-
expansive judicial interpretation. Ideally, the harmonised framework would properly distinguish accessory 
from primary liability. While the current “blended” approach taken by the CJEU has the advantage of 
enabling harmonisation through case law, legislative intervention would make such expediencies 
redundant. At the same time, lessons can be learnt from the Court’s recent decisions in the area. The 
legislator is certainly free to modify existing EU secondary law as it sees fit, as long as it respects the 
Charter. Yet undercutting established case law undermines the development of a coherent system. Instead 
of grafting supervenient provisions like Article 17 on to EU copyright law, the EU legislator would be wise 
take its cue from existing case law.  
 
Examining this case law reveals the outline of a convincing framework for a European accessory copyright 
liability system. As seen above, while traditionally copyright infringement has relied only on the 
examination of the defendant’s conduct, in its decisions on accessory liability, the CJEU has added a new 
mental element. Happily, this approach accords with the usual schematic relied upon in countries with 
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existing accessory liability doctrines. As a rule, such regimes depend accessory liability on two essential 
elements: a “conduct element” and a “mental element”.57 We suggest that a future EU intermediary liability 
copyright regime should follow a similar approach. While the first element should focus on whether the 
defendant’s behaviour has contributed to a copyright infringement, the second should concern their inner 
involvement in the infringement, i.e. whether they demonstrated the mindset of a culpable party. Where at 
least one of these elements is absent, the defendant should be absolved from any liability. If both are 
satisfied, two possibilities arise: either the defendant should immediately be held liable for the infringement 
or they are placed under an obligation to take appropriate action. 
 
Careful consideration of the right standard for both elements is necessary, as well as of the appropriate 
consequences where they are both met. Again, the CJEU’s case law can guide the analysis. Where 
ambiguity remains, other sources of legislative inspiration should be considered. In this regard, one 
important question concerns the relevance of the ECD’s safe harbours. It may seem logical that a well-
crafted defence should do more than mirror the provisions that determine infringement. We suggest 
however that the safe harbours should not be approached in this way. They were adopted not to provide 
exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright holders, but to introduce harmonised horizontal rules for the 
smooth functioning of the single market.58 It is therefore appropriate to treat them as guidelines for a future 
harmonised EU accessory liability regime for copyright.59 By the same token, Article 15 ECD, as well as 
the Court’s existing case law on “fair balance” and injunctions should also be taken into consideration. The 
proposal below draws heavily from all three of these sources.  
1. The Conduct Element of Accessory Liability 
 
As explained in Section B.I, the CJEU’s approach to communication to the public has gradually evolved 
over the past decade. Helpfully, recent case law has planted the seeds for a harmonised system for accessory 
liability in copyright. It can therefore be relied upon to guide the construction of the elements of a 
harmonised European accessory liability regime. A more detailed examination is thus appropriate. In this 
section, we start with the conduct element. The Court’s decisions on the notion of an “act of 
communication” are helpful in tracing this out. As noted above, the “individualised” approach adopted by 
the CJEU has allowed it gradually to relax its approach.  
 
Notably, the majority of the CJEU’s rulings in this area deal with what might be termed “secondary use”. 
They thus concern either retransmissions of broadcasts by wire or wireless means (see e.g. ITV 
Broadcasting, SBS Belgium, and zürs.net)60 or the playing of phonograms or broadcasts in a public space 
(see e.g. SGAE, Divani Akropolis, Del Corso, Phonographic Performance (Ireland) and Reha Training).61 
In these cases, the Court’s analysis still remains closely tied to the classic language of a “transmission”, 
that is embedded in Recital 23 of the InfoSoc Directive.62 According to this, the right of communication to 
the public should not cover any acts other than the transmission or retransmission of a work to the public 
by wire or wireless means. A wrinkle however then appears. Starting with Svensson, cases come before the 
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CJEU that concern acts of secondary use rather than secondary infringement, i.e. acts whose infringing 
nature depends on the existence of a primary infringement by another. The Court accepted these as valid 
acts of communication. GS Media, Filmspeler63 and Ziggo continued this trend, fleshing out the relevant 
principles.  
 
The expansive tendency of the Court was enabled by the language of a “deliberate/intentional intervention 
to give access”, already adopted in previous decisions. The notion of an “intervention”, allowed the Court 
to move discretely beyond “transmissions”, broadening the scope of the restricted act. So, for example, 
Svensson incorporates within the notion of an act of communication “an intervention without which users 
would not be able to access the works transmitted” by another, thus apparently differentiating between 
“transmissions” and other “acts of communication”. In Ziggo, the Court confirms this approach by stating 
that an act of communication “covers” (but apparently is not limited to) any transmission or retransmission 
of a work.64 Similarly, it is “sufficient” that the work is made available to the public.65 The notion of an “act 
of communication” is ultimately defined as “any act by which a user, with full knowledge of the relevant 
facts, provides its clients with access to protected works”. 66 These decisions reveal the appropriate scope 
of the conduct element in a harmonised EU accessory liability regime: it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the notion of an “intervention” that does not amount to a “transmission”67 is where a harmonised accessory 
liability regime would come into operation.  
 
Of course, not any “intervention” will suffice. As noted above, the Court had initially required that the 
intervention must be “indispensable”68 or at least “essential”69 for the dissemination of the work to third 
parties. This approach eventually ran into problems, as the theory developed in the Court’s rulings did not 
properly match the facts to which it was applied. So, as the AG observed in GS Media, a hyperlink to a 
work is not in fact indispensable to the making of that work available on the Internet, but merely “facilitates” 
locating it online.70 Eventually, in Ziggo, the Court adjusted the language to accommodate this reality. The 
current standard is therefore that of “interventions in the absence of which the public would be able to enjoy 
the work only with difficulty.”71  
 
The result has been an expansion of the notion of an act of communication to the public to cover not only 
actual transmissions of works, but also acts that facilitate such transmissions. Following this model, the 
“conduct element” of accessory copyright liability becomes a strikingly commodious one. The bar is set 
very low, incorporating any non-minimal participation in the copyright infringement of another party. As 
the hyperlinking case law betrays, such participation may even take the form of an ex post promotion of the 
infringing behaviour. The Court appears to place causality in centre stage, so that the existence of some sort 
of causal connection to the primary infringement, or at least its consequences for the right-holder, seems to 
be necessary. However, the connection need not be sine qua non. All that is required is that, without the 
defendant’s involvement, “in principle”72 infringement would be “more complex”.73 The implication is that 
of a de minimis rule.74  
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It is worth noting that, in their national law, EU Member States have often taken different approaches. For 
example, in English law the doctrine of joint tortfeasance recognises three possible “participation links” 
connecting the behaviour of parties jointly liable for the same tort: “authorisation”, “inducement” or 
“procurement”, and entering into a “common design”.75 As copyright infringement is a tort, the same 
principles apply to identify accessories in copyright cases.76 English doctrine emphasises the distinction of 
these conduct elements from the concept of a “mere facilitation”, which is seen as incapable of giving rise 
to joint tortfeasance. Similarly, in Germany, under the rule of Article 830(2) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(German Civil Code – BGB), instigators and accessories to a tort (including copyright infringement) are 
considered Mittäter, i.e. joint tortfeasors responsible for the damage. 
 
Yet, commentators have questioned the conceptual soundness of these approaches. For example, Sales has 
worried that: “In many cases, […] the dividing line between inducing a third party to commit a wrong and 
assisting him in its commission is so fine as to be non-existent”.77 Indeed, careful examination of these 
notions reveals embedded within them the implication of a mental identification of the collaborator with 
the primary wrongdoer. Arguably, the terms “authorisation”, “procurement” or “common design” imply an 
inherent mental dimension. Detangling them from that dimension distorts their natural meaning. Similarly, 
German legal theory justifies the liability of Mittäter on the existence of a “psychisch vermittelte 
Kausalität”, i.e. a psychological causation that connects the accessory to the act of the primary infringer.78  
 
In our view, if it is to be the defendant’s state of mind that determines which conduct leads to accessory 
liability, then this should be explicitly acknowledged by the law. The mental element should be examined 
as such, not subsumed within the analysis of the conduct element. Obviously, this approach does not offer 
great scope for meaningful distinctions between different kinds of intermediary conduct. But this is not 
necessarily inappropriate. Instead, we suggest that the purpose of the conduct element is to separate the 
chaff of random bystanders from the grain of the involved accessories, i.e. persons whose liability seems at 
first blush plausible. The “facilitation” of infringement should accordingly suffice. As all Internet 
intermediaries will meet this requirement as soon as their services are used by another to commit a copyright 
infringement, accessory liability will depend on how an intermediary fares in the subsequent analysis.79  
2. The Mental Element of Accessory Liability 
 
While accessory liability for a copyright infringement cannot be established without a finding of a conduct 
element, that alone should not be sufficient. Instead, the case law of the CJEU has emphasised that a second 
condition must be met: that of a mental element. So far, the mental element has only been mentioned by 
the CJEU in accessory liability cases. As we have already observed, it is reasonable to assume that future 
decisions will also limit its applicability to such cases, preserving the strict nature of primary copyright 
liability. The result would be a divide between classic “transmission” cases, for which no mental element 
is necessary, and “intervention short of transmission” cases, where a mental element would be required.  
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The next question concerns the appropriate threshold for the mental element. General legal theory teaches 
that two main possibilities exist: the mental element may take the form of intent or knowledge.80 Again, the 
CJEU’s case law leads the way. GS Media, Filmspeler and Ziggo all indicate that knowledge of the primary 
infringement should be sufficient. At the same time, the Court is not oblivious to intent either. Close 
examination of the wording in Filmspeler and Ziggo makes clear that both concern accessories whose 
involvement in the infringement was intentional. In the first of these, the Court makes much of the fact that 
the advertisements of the multimedia player specifically stated that it made it possible to watch audiovisual 
content made available on the Internet without right-holder authorisation.81 Likewise, in the second, the 
Court emphasised the operators’ “purpose to make protected works available to the users” and to 
“encourage the latter to make copies of those works”.82 The final conclusion makes sense: while the stronger 
mental element of intention will certainly suffice, it does not appear to be necessary for accessory liability. 
 
A bigger question concerns the type of knowledge required. From the outset, it is important to note that the 
knowledge relevant to the mental element in accessory liability is knowledge of the lack of authorisation 
for the primary restricted act. This should not be confused with a condition of volitional engagement in the 
conduct. Even before GS Media, the CJEU has repeatedly made reference to the fact that the “intervention” 
representing the act of communication must be made “in full knowledge of the circumstances”, i.e. should 
be “deliberate”.83 This wording implies an understanding on the part of the defendant that their conduct is 
occurring rather than of the infringing nature of the behaviour of another. Its purpose seems to be to exclude 
inadvertent behaviour from giving rise to liability.84 It thus appears that, according to the CJEU, deliberately 
engaging in an “intervention” should be necessary for findings of both accessory and primary copyright 
infringement.85 By contrast, the mental element of accessory liability used in GS Media, Filmspeler and 
Ziggo is clearly focused on the infringing nature of the material that is the object of the “intervention”.  
 
Further than this, two distinctions are important: that between “actual” and “constructive” knowledge and 
that between “general” and “specific” knowledge. Here, the case law paints a more complicated picture. 
On the one hand, GS Media is unambiguous. It required that the provider of the hyperlink “knew or ought 
to have known that the hyperlink he posted provides access to a work illegally placed on the internet”.86 
This points towards a standard of constructive, but specific knowledge, i.e. one that requires that the 
accessory at least had reason to believe that the specific work to which it was linking was infringing. The 
rebuttable presumption of knowledge introduced for profit-seeking hyperlinkers reinforces this threshold. 
By contrast, in Ziggo, general knowledge that the defendant’s services were used to provide access to works 
published without authorisation from the right-holders was accepted as sufficient.87 The Court also listed a 
series of indications of both actual (e.g. notification of infringement) and constructive knowledge (e.g. the 
large number of torrent files),88 but was not clear which of these marked the threshold.  
 
On the basis of these decisions, we can conclude that both specific and general knowledge should be 
accepted as relevant. Historically, national European courts have tended to opt for the stricter “specific” 
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approach; however, with the rise of modern technologies, a relaxing of the standard towards “general” 
knowledge is discernible.89 Indeed, as the case law shows, the specific or general nature of the knowledge 
will largely be determined by the underlying conduct element. Whereas in GS Media the provider of the 
hyperlink is simply “intervening to provide access” to an unauthorised copy of a single protected work, the 
impact of the management of an online sharing platform is much more severe. Where a broad definition of 
the conduct element is accepted, a matching mental element is appropriate. Following the GS Media lead, 
a rebuttable presumption of knowledge may also be introduced in cases where the platform acted in pursuit 
of a profit. This should only be the case however where the profit-pursuing actions of the platform were 
targeted at a specific infringement. Simply operating a platform for profit should not be enough.90 
 
Similarly, given the oft-referenced objective of EU copyright law to provide right-holders with a “high 
level of protection”,91 our proposal suggests that both actual and constructive knowledge should be 
sufficient. This would also be consistent with the general rule applicable in negligence liability in most 
jurisdictions.92 At the same time, the wording “ought to have known” carries significant meaning that 
should not be overlooked: the accessory cannot be expected to go to unreasonable lengths to uncover 
infringements it has no reason to suspect. Again, the case law of the CJEU is helpful. In L’Oréal v eBay, 
the Court relied on the concept of a “diligent economic operator” to determine when a host service provider 
should be considered to have “awareness of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or 
information is apparent” under Article 14 ECD.93 The same notion can be re-purposed for the construction 
of a harmonised regime for accessory copyright liability. Thus, the intermediary should only be considered 
to have constructive knowledge when it is aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringement 
would have been apparent to a “diligent economic operator”. Reliable notification should suffice as an 
indication of actual knowledge.  
 
Most importantly, the general monitoring prohibition of Article 15 ECD must be respected, as must the 
limits set by the Charter which underpin this prohibition. An accessory cannot be said to have constructive 
knowledge where that knowledge could only be acquired through monitoring all of the information it 
handles. Up until now, these limits have only be considered by the Court in the context of injunctions, but 
there is no reason why they should not apply more generally: if the imposition of an obligation on an 
intermediary would disrupt the “fair balance” between fundamental rights even where this is ordered by a 
court, that should all the more be the case when imposed ex ante with no judicial oversight.  
3. The Violation of a Reasonable Duty of Care 
 
The above expansive conclusions on the scope of the mental element do not mean that it has no practical 
relevance. We propose that the qualification of the mental element have impact on the final piece of the 
puzzle: the consequences of the accumulation of a conduct and mental element for the defendant. In this 
area too, the case law of the CJEU leads the way. To date, outcomes have differed from decision to decision.  
 
In GS Media, the Court noted that right-holders have the possibility of informing the providers of hyperlinks 
that the work to which they have linked has been communicated to the public without permission and of 
taking action against them if they refuse to remove the links.94 Whether notification represents a hard 
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90 It is relevant that in Filmspeler and Ziggo, both of which concerned general knowledge, no rebuttable presumption of knowledge based on profit 
was introduced, the Court instead limiting itself to indicating that profit is an important factor.  
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condition binding right-holders before a hyperlink provider can be found liable is not made clear by the 
decision’s wording. If so, the result would be the establishment of a NTD regime.95 In Filmspeler and Ziggo, 
by contrast, no mention of an opportunity to avoid liability through take-down is made. The Court simply 
concludes that where the conduct element is accompanied by the appropriate mental element, a 
communication to the public has taken place.96  
 
We suggest that the explanation to this apparent inconsistency can be found in the nature of the mental 
element. As noted above, in Filmspeler and Ziggo, in addition to mere knowledge, there were also 
indications of intention to promote infringement on the part of end-users. It is arguable that these drive the 
harsh outcome for the intermediaries in those decisions. By contrast, in GS Media, the only possibility 
considered was that of knowledge.97 This is a reasonable interpretation that would point towards a 
sophisticated liability scheme. Indeed, attaching different consequences to different degrees of mental 
involvement in the commission of a tort has strong roots in European tort law.98 We suggest that this 
approach should be further pursued in EU accessory copyright liability. A sensible framework could require 
that, if an accessory intended an infringement, its behaviour must be understood to be by definition 
unacceptable. Liability should therefore automatically ensue. On the other hand, if the intermediary has no 
intent, but does have knowledge of the infringement, the violation of a duty of care must first be established 
before liability can be found.99 
 
What is missing in the CJEU decisions to date is any consideration of what is to happen where the defendant 
had only general knowledge (e.g. through notification or due to large amounts of infringing content) that it 
was facilitating infringement. What we suggest is that the duties of care to be imposed on an accessory 
should be tailored to the kind of knowledge they display: the type of duty should depend on the type of 
knowledge. 
 
Indeed, it is appropriate that, as GS Media suggests, if the intermediary has specific knowledge – whether 
actual (e.g. through notification) or constructive (e.g. due to circumstances that would have made it apparent 
to a “diligent economic operator”) – of a particular infringement it has through its conduct supported, it will 
often be reasonable to expect that it remove the infringing content. We suggest that, depending on the 
circumstances, other measures (including preventive ones) might also be appropriate, e.g. the suspension 
of repeat infringers, notifying the authorities or the provision of identifying data on the perpetrator to the 
authorities.100 On the other hand, if the intermediary has only general knowledge of mass infringements 
taking place using its systems, the removal of content will become much harder. Without specific 
knowledge, the intermediary will have difficulties locating the infringement without both violating its users’ 
fundamental rights and expending disproportionate time and energy (thus threatening its own freedom to 
conduct a business). Other measures may however be considered. The posting of warning duties is an 
obvious candidate. In all cases, in view of the general monitoring prohibition of Article 15 ECD and the 
limits set by the Charter, accessories should not be expected to proactively search for infringing content. 
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As a result, notice-and-stay-down regimes should be excluded. All duties of care imposed on accessories 
should be “reasonable”.101 
 
Where the accessory fails to take the measures due, assuming it had the ability to take those measures or at 
least ought to have ensured that it had that ability, it should be held liable. Liability may be for monetary 
compensation, injunctive relief or both, depending on policy considerations. In our view, no liability should 
be imposed if the accessory: (a) had no knowledge; (b) having knowledge, took all measures appropriate to 
the knowledge it possessed; or (c) had knowledge, but no ability to take appropriate measures nor an 
obligation to ensure that it had such an ability. A final possibility may also be considered: if the intermediary 
did not take the appropriate measures that would have been expected of it on a flagrantly persistent basis, 
intent can arguably be inferred and full liability for damages applied.102  
4. Interim conclusion  
 
As the above analysis reveals, the basic elements for a harmonised European system of accessory liability 
for copyright and related rights infringement can already be detected in the case law. What is missing is 
their organisation into a self-standing structure and the application of that structure on a broad basis. At the 
moment, accessory liability is folded into the rules of primary liability. This is, moreover, only the case for 
communication to the public: no accessory liability regime for participation in the infringement of other 
exclusive rights is established. Rather than cramming accessory liability into a single exclusive right, a clear 
framework distinguishing it from primary liability should be introduced. Ideally, this framework ought to 
be set by the legislator in a systematic way, instead of trickling out of the CJEU on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Of course, a more targeted approach could also be envisaged, tailored specifically to Internet intermediaries 
or certain types thereof (such as OCSSPs). The preference should however be for a more generalised 
harmonisation that can allow for a future-proof regime, reliant on principles rather than reactive to 
circumstances and the pressure of lobby groups. Moreover, unlike Article 17, any new provision should 
complement, rather than undermine the pre-existing framework and its CJEU interpretation. 
 
Would this system alone give right-holders the tools to eliminated online copyright infringement? 
Undoubtedly, the answer is “no”. A properly balanced regime for accessory copyright liability – particularly 
one that respects fundamental rights – would not hold intermediaries liable for online infringements where 
there is no mental element or where duties of care have not been violated. It therefore can only offer part 
of the answer. Once it is in place, both intermediaries and right-holders will have a clear idea of their legal 
standing. If no liability can be imposed on the intermediary, attention should then shift to a different 
question: how should the primary liability of the end-users be addressed? 
II. An Alternative Compensation System for Content-sharing Platforms 
 
The fragementation in the area of intermediary liability can be dealt with through European harmonisation. 
By contrast, online infringements by the end-users of content-sharing platforms requires more innovative 
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solutions. One such solution can be found in the adoption of an “alternative compensation system”. 
Generally speaking, this term refers to legal models that replace direct authorisation of certain types of 
online activities with a scheme for licensing such use and ensuring remuneration to right-holders or at least 
individual creators, i.e. authors and performers.103 The use in question would be “permitted but paid”.104 
Different legal models could in theory support such a scheme, ranging from voluntary, extended and 
mandatory collective management to compulsory or statutory licences. These models impose increasing 
levels of restriction on exclusive rights. So-called “voluntary” models merely affect the exercise of the 
right, whereas “mandatory” models impact its very nature, replacing an exclusive right for certain uses with 
a corresponding right of remuneration or fair compensation.105 These models do not seek further to 
strengthen the enforcement measures available to right-holders. Rather, they take a broader normative view 
of the copyright system as one that should enhance lawful access to and use of works, while ensuring fair 
remuneration for right-holders, in particular creators. 
 
One collective licensing mechanism that has received attention as a possible solution for online uses is that 
collective licensing with an extended effect.106 The DSM Directive significantly harmonises this 
authorisation mechanism in its Article 12,107 which envisages three different mechanisms that have the 
effect of extending collective licenses to non-represented right-holders and their works in a certain territory: 
extended collective licensing, legal mandates, and presumptions of representation.108 Article 12 subjects 
collective licensing with an extended effect to a number of requirements: the licensing mechanism must be 
managed by a CMO, within well-defined areas of use, where direct licensing is too costly or impractical, 
and in a manner that “safeguards the legitimate interests” of right-holders.109 The provision further sets out 
a number of safeguards that must be put in place for this mechanism to be valid: the CMO must be 
sufficiently representative; there must be equal treatment between represented and non-represented right-
holders; non-represented right-holders must be able to opt-out of the system easily and effectively at any 
time; and CMOs have to comply with several information obligations towards right-holders.110  
 
Although there is some debate as to the legal nature of this mechanism, we are of the view that collective 
licensing with extended effect is not a copyright exception or limitation,111 at least where the above 
safeguards, and in particular an opt-out, are put in place. Instead, using the terminology above, this would 
be a “voluntary” model.112 
 
The mechanism of Article 12 has been viewed as a possible option for obtaining the authorisations for 
OCSSPs required by Article 17 of the DSM Directive. Arguably, it could also provide a promising 
solution in the context of our proposed model. Still, as discussed elsewhere, it faces significant 
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challenges.113 To begin with, Article 17 does not create a framework for pan-European licensing, but 
solely for voluntary territorial collective licenses. In addition, it sets out a number of requirements that 
will be challenging to meet in the short and medium-term for CMOs in many Member States, such as that 
of representativeness. Even for Member States where some CMOs in some fields meet the requirements 
(e.g. online music), other CMOs in other fields may not (e.g. visual arts). The result would be the co-
existence of extended collective licenses in some Member States (of parts thereof) with a system of 
individual or limited voluntary collective licensing for platforms in other Member States, leading to a 
fragmented EU landscape. Finally, because extended collective licensing is an alien mechanism for many 
Member States, its roll out will necessarily be slow and complex, making it more of a long-term 
proposition, even if is adopted consistently across the EU for all types of uses by content-sharing 
platforms.  
 
In light of the above, we are of the view that for types of mass use where enforcement is ineffective, too 
costly, or even undesirable – due to conflicts with fundamental rights and other public interest concerns – 
mandatory variants of alternative compensation systems are compelling propositions. Indeed, such systems 
are best suited to deal with the substantive and territorial fragmentation of copyright that characterises the 
copyright acquis, to provide legal certainty, and to ensure the participation of users and right-holders in the 
system.114  
 
Building on precedents with a long tradition in copyright law – such as continental European private 
copying schemes – a number of authors and policy makers have been calling for similar solutions in the 
current “value gap” debate, as supplements to the harmonisation of intermediary liability at EU level.115 
Our proposal goes in a similar direction. In essence, it aims to legalise and remunerate a broad swath of 
infringing online acts by individuals (discussed at B.II.) that are carried out through the services of certain 
Internet intermediaries. Combined with the accessory copyright liability regime proposed in C.I., our 
alternative system could close the regulatory “value gap” arising from the lack of adequate rules to deal 
with mass uncompensated online infringements by users in a way that is consistent with the goals of 
copyright law and achieves a “fair balance” between competing rights and interests. The scope and main 
elements of the proposal are outlined below.  
 
1. Scope of the system  
 
The scope of our proposed system includes different design elements. Namely, it is a statutory license 
coupled with a mandatory exception, applying to specific types of subject matter and specific activities of 
users (and, by extension, of platforms), coupled with a right of fair compensation, and accompaned by 
certain obligations on payment and safeguards for the affected platforms. These elements are elaborated on 
below.  
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(a) Statutory licence and mandatory exception 
 
The system we envisage would involve a statutory licence, based on an exception for individual online 
users.116 The exception would privilege the non-commercial use of works on user-upload or user-generated 
content platforms, jointly referred here as “content-sharing platforms”. Such platforms would include 
Internet intermediaries that provide hosting services enabling users to upload and exchange inter alia 
copyright-protected works and related subject matter. 
 
The exception should be mandatory, not only because of the cross-border and single market relevance of 
the uses covered, but also due to its strong normative underpinnings. As argued elsewhere, an exception of 
this type – i.e. one applying to user-generated content – will improve legal certainty for users and content-
sharing platforms.117 It will furthermore align copyright with online social norms, resulting in benefits for 
the respect and legitimacy of the law. Finally, an exception that covers user-generated content would 
function as an online extension of the concepts of quotation, parody and transformative use, which are 
clearly grounded in freedom of expression and information.118 In its case law, the Court has used this 
fundamental freedom to limit remedies for copyright infringement and to justify the existence and broad 
interpretation of the parody and quotation exceptions.119 In view of this, an optional exception would risk 
insufficient harmonisation and fail to protect adequately the fundamental rights dimension of privileged 
uses.120 
 
The exception would directly cover and authorise acts by individual end-users of content-sharing platforms 
that are natural persons. This means that neither legal persons nor other collective entities would be direct 
beneficiaries of the system. This marks a difference from the DSM Directive’s approach. According to 
Article 17(2) DSMD, if OCSSPs obtain a licence from right-holders, this must also extend to acts of users 
of their services covered by the right of communication to the public, provided they “are not acting on a 
commercial basis or where their activity does not generate significant revenues”. Hence, where such 
agreements are concluded, the provider will assume liability for infringement by end-users by virtue of its 
contractual arrangement with right-holders. In a way, the platform will be passing on its licence to its users 
for their non-commercial activities.121 Where no licensing agreements are concluded by the platform, end-
users will not be shielded from liability – unless their activities are privileged by an existing exception.122 
In this no-agreement scenario, platforms will only be able to escape liability if they can show they have 
made the “best efforts” to license required by Art. 17(4) DSMD.123  
 
By contrast, our proposal does not rely on the licensing of exclusive rights through platforms. Rather, it 
focuses on an exception to the benefit of users. At the same time, it would indirectly benefit certain content-
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sharing platforms, on condition that that they are compliant with the accessory copyright liability regime 
sketched out above. In practice, this would mean the following. 
 
To qualify, a platform must not be making an own use of the work that triggers the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and communication or making available to the public under Articles 2 and 3 of the InfoSoc 
Directive.124 If there is no own use, whether the content-sharing platform is accessorily liable should be 
considered, meaning that it is necessary to examine its conduct and mental elements.125 By exempting the 
acts of individual users, this regime would heighten the threshold required for a finding of knowledge or 
intent of infringement by the platform as regards uses outside the scope of the exception. This is because 
accessory liability would depend on the platform having knowledge that the use in question is either 
commercial or otherwise not covered by the exception.  
 
For platforms, this solution would bring significant benefits as compared to the approach in the DSM 
Directive. It would increase legal certainty by clarifying their liability for acts of their users, while 
preventing the extension of the exclusive right to their normal activities. For acts of end-users covered by 
the exception, platforms would be allowed significant breathing space to provide their services and would 
not be subject to injunctions under Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. Finally, due to the privilege granted 
to users, our proposal (in contrast with Article 17(4) DSMD) discourages preventive filtering, an aspect 
that bolsters its compliance with fundamental rights and the ban on general monitoring in Article 15 ECD. 
At the same time, as specified above at C.I.3., there remains ample space for reactive duties of care, such 
as NTD obligations, to be imposed on platforms, upon obtaining knowledge of infringements regarding 
content or uses outside the exception’s scope.  
(b) Subject Matter Scope 
 
In theory, our system could apply to all types of protected works and other subject matter, domestic or 
foreign to an EU Member State, susceptible to upload and use in a content-sharing website. In practice, for 
reasons of compliance with the three-step test,126 some subject matter exclusions are sensible. As explained 
below, the exception underlying our proposal operates as a restriction on the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and communication to the public in Articles 2 and 3 InfoSoc Directive. It is therefore logical 
to follow the directive’s regime and exclude computer programs and databases from the scope of our 
statutory licence.127 This exclusion is further justified by the idiosyncratic motivations and legal regimes 
for these types of subject matter in EU law, and the fact that the software and database sectors operate 
according to specific logics, so that they do not suffer from the problem of large-scale infringement to the 
same extent as other types of content.128 In our view, many of the same arguments are valid for 
videogames.129 A practical consideration strengthens such exclusions: these categories have to date 
“remained largely exempt from statutory or collective licensing”, on which our system relies.130  
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In essence, the main policy choice is whether to extend the system and underlying exception to all or most 
types of works/subject matter covered by the InfoSoc Directive, or advance a category-based approach, 
aimed solely at certain types of content popular across content-sharing platforms and for which – and to the 
extent that – there are mature structures of collective rights management: music, including the musical 
work, fixations of performances and phonograms; text; visual; and film/video.131 The best option would be 
to have the system mirror the subject matter scope of the InfoSoc Directive, as that would ensure the internal 
consistency of the statutory license. The obvious issue with this approach is that sectors with under-
developed collective rights management structures would need to develop these before being able to fully 
benefit from the system.  
(c) Substantive Rights Scope: Authorised Acts 
 
Our proposal is based on an exception for non-commercial online acts of reproduction and communication 
to the public by users of content-sharing platforms. For the types of use covered by the exception, the 
exclusive rights at issue would be recast as rights to fair compensation. 
 
Existing proposals differ somewhat in this respect. For example, Hilty and Bauer suggest an exception that 
would cover the act of uploading and any uses in preparation of user-generated content.132 In a slightly 
different approach, the proposal by Senftleben et al. covers also the further dissemination of user-generated 
remixes and mashups of protected content.133  
 
In our view, the exception must clearly apply to any use covered by the rights of reproduction and 
communication to the public that takes place in context of content-sharing platforms.134 It should further 
clarify that it applies to transformative uses (e.g. certain types of remixes or mashups), including those that 
lie in the grey area between reproduction and adaptation.135 To be sure, this would amount to an indirect 
(partial) harmonisation of the right of adaptation. Still, it would prevent legal uncertainty in the application 
of the exception, that could undermine its effectiveness. 
 
As a matter of legal design, the application of a statutory licence to at least two exclusive rights can give 
rise to one or more copyright exceptions. For example, Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive lists cases 
allowing for a limitation to the reproduction right, whereas Article 5(3) of the same directive, as well as the 
Orphan Works Directive, set out exceptions to the rights of reproduction and communication to the public. 
Therefore, in this respect, our exception is not a radical departure from existing law.  
 
Still, we should be mindful to avoid overlaps with existing exceptions susceptible to application to the types 
of online use targeted here. These include temporary and transient copying, quotation, incidental inclusion 
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and caricature, parody and pastiche.136 In fact, Article 17(7) of the DSM Directive imposes on Member 
States an obligation to ensure that users of OCSSPs benefit from certain exceptions defined as optional in 
Article 5 InfoSoc Directive. The exact legal nature and scope of the exceptions in paragraph (7) are unclear 
at this stage. At the very least, the provision will have the effect of making such exceptions mandatory and 
fully applicable in the context of uploads in OCSSPs. In any case, while potential overlaps cannot be 
excluded, their existence is not detrimental to our proposal. After all, overlaps already exist in the InfoSoc 
Directive, for example between private copying and reprography.137 What is important is to take such 
overlaps into consideration when designing the system and calculating the amount of compensation due.138 
 
The thornier issue lies with the central characteristic of the exception: that it privileges only non-commercial 
use. The definition of non-commercial use is still an unsettled matter in the EU copyright acquis, despite 
the fact that the concept features in various provisions of the legal framework.139 The concept also lies at 
the heart of the above-mentioned Article 17(2) DSM Directive.140 
 
As argued elsewhere, the notion of “non-commercial” should be understood as a legal standard (as opposed 
to a rule) and an autonomous concept of EU law.141 In essence, this means that it should apply to the use of 
works by individuals not in direct competition with use by the copyright-holders. To determine this 
standard, recourse can be had to criteria that are both subjective, like the profit-making purpose of the user, 
and objective, such as the commercial character of the use.142 In the context of content-sharing content 
platforms, where most individual users do not carry out a business activity or make profit from the platform, 
the application of such a standard will, as a rule, be straightforward.  
 
Other authors follow a similar approach. In a nod to the second condition of the three-step test,143 Hilty and 
Bauer propose that whether a use is non-commercial should be determined by excluding uses that conflict 
with the normal exploitation of works because they are on a commercial scale or serve a commercial 
objective.144 To make the distinction clear, the authors propose adding recitals to support the exception, 
listing positive and negative examples, such as an exclusion of uploads in peer-to-peer platforms.145 Further 
recitals could be envisaged to flesh out subjective and objective criteria to access the commercial nature of 
a use. For example, it could be stated that the concept of non-commercial use focuses on online activities 
of consumption, enjoyment, reference, or expression, outside the context of a market or business activity, 
and excludes acts with a direct profit intention of for monetary compensation.146 It would also be sensible, 
in line with Article 17(2) DSM Directive, to include in the concept activities that do “not generate 
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significant revenues”, as these are unlikely to encroach upon the normal exploitation of works or produce 
harm to right-holders. 
 
An important point is that the concept does not exclude acts of end-users that, although not carried out with 
a profit-making intention, nonetheless bear economic significance. To exclude from the exception any type 
of use or works with economic value would deprive the exception of any useful scope and effect, limiting 
it to de minimis use. The example that comes to mind is that of cost savings for users that would be willing 
to pay for access to the work outside the content-sharing platform. The payment of fair compensation would 
be designed to address such potential harm to right-holders, returning it to tolerable levels, provided the 
permitted use does not conflict with major sources of right revenues of copyright-holders.147 Grey area 
cases on the commercial/non-commercial qualification of a use will be decided by national courts and 
ultimately by the CJEU, in the interpretation of this autonomous concept.148  
 
A related aspect is the need to ensure the system enables the commercial exploitation of works on content-
sharing platforms. Activities like the automatic posting of advertisements on the same page as the work, 
but unrelated to its content do not appear to us at the moment problematic. Conversely, the direct 
monetisation of a work by either the end-user or the platform (e.g. through advertisements on an uploaded 
video tailored to its contents) should generally fall outside the scope of the exception, as it would amount 
to a commercial use. This would mean that such monetisation would require an agreement with the right-
holder, although intermediaries might avoid liability where there is no agreement, if they abide by the 
conditions of the applicable intermediary liability regime. If such agreement is reached, the 
commercialisation of the work must be taken into account when calculating fair compensation for its 
upload, as it would necessarily mean that, from that moment on, no “harm” would be caused to the rights-
holder. The result would be that the work would remain accessible, but no fair compensation would be due 
under our system, as there would be no harm to compensate: the right-holders would already be remunerated 
through contract. 
 
A key point is that the exception would not require the content-sharing platform at issue to be itself a non-
commercial enterprise. The non-commercial restriction only refers to the activities of the user in uploading 
and disseminating the content through the platform, that is neither making own use of the content or 
qualifies as accessorily liable. This precision is important, as it ensures the effectiveness of the limitation 
and its potential to generate significant revenue for right-holders as fair compensation, by allowing the 
system to include for-profit platforms.  
 
Finally, Hilty and Bauer also propose that only works that are freely available online (being either uploaded 
from an authorised source, covered by an exception or limitation or by an implied license) can be privileged 
by the exception.149 This requirement mirrors that of “lawfulness of source” developed by the CJEU in ACI 
Adam when interpreting the private copying limitation in light of the three-step test.150 Although we have 
reservations as to whether this requirement is truly necessary under the three-step test, its application in the 
present context would be useful, as it would provide a clear legal basis for right-holders to notify platforms 
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that are otherwise (prior to this knowledge-making notification) not accessorily liable, so that they may 
remove or disable access to the infringing copy. It also makes clear that re-uploading of content available 
online through commercial channels subject to technical restrictions of access (e.g. via a streaming service 
like Spotify or Netflix) would not be covered by our proposed exception.  
2. Fair Compensation Right and its Calculation 
 
The statutory licence proposed here relies on an exception to exclusive rights tied to a right of equitable 
remuneration151 or fair compensation.152 These concepts are not synonymous. Equitable remuneration rights 
are commonly tied to compulsory licences for uses or forms of exploitation of works not previously covered 
by an exclusive right. Examples at the international level are the equitable remuneration rights for the 
broadcasting of works and for “secondary uses” of phonograms.153 In the EU acquis, there exists a right for 
an unwaivable and equitable remuneration for rental, an optional right of remuneration for public lending, 
and rights for a single equitable remuneration for broadcasting and communication to the public.154 The 
CJEU interprets the concept of equitable remuneration as based on the “value of the use in trade” and 
following a logic of balance between competing interests.155  
 
“Fair compensation” has different contours. This concept accompanies certain limitation-based statutory 
licences. Before the InfoSoc Directive, most European systems would subject compensated limitations to 
the payment of equitable remuneration, following the blueprint of other non-exclusive rights in the acquis. 
After the directive, that concept was replaced by “fair compensation”. Rights of fair compensation are now 
recognised for reprographic reproductions, private copying, reproductions of broadcasts by non-
commercial social institutions, and for use of orphan works by specific organisations.156  
 
In our view, the concept of fair compensation appears to be the most suitable companion to the exception. 
First, Recital 36 of the InfoSoc Directive suggests a preference of the EU legislator for this concept in 
connection with future compensated limitations on the directive’s exclusive rights, including reproduction 
and communication to the public, i.e. the rights to which our proposed exception applies. Second, there is 
a vast body of CJEU judgments interpreting “fair compensation” as an autonomous concept of EU law, 
thus providing a solid basis for its seamless implementation in the acquis.157 
 
To be consistent with EU law, our exception should be aligned with this autonomous concept, as interpreted 
by the CJEU. Under this case law, the right to fair compensation is defined as unwaivable and vesting solely 
in the authors and related right-holders that in EU law are granted the exclusive rights affected by the 
exception, i.e. those listed in Articles 2 and 3 of the InfoSoc Directive.158 As a result, the grant of a right of 
fair compensation ensures, first, that creators receive a share of the amounts collected under the statutory 
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licence system and, second, that they are not forced to transfer that share to exploiters, i.e. publishers and 
other derivative right-holders.159  
 
Since the normative concern with the remuneration of creators is at the heart of the “value gap” debate, it 
makes sense to adopt a fair compensation right that is both unwaivable and primarily for the benefit of 
creators. This would ensure a steady flow of rights revenue to authors and performers, thereby incentivising 
and rewarding creative efforts, while protecting creators from ill-advised transfers of their rights to other 
parties in the context of unbalanced contractual negotiations.160 
 
The amount of fair compensation should reflect the harm suffered by creators and other right-holders of the 
affected exclusive rights.161 The potential harm caused by the introduction of an exception in the context of 
our alternative compensation system should be considered in terms of the prejudice suffered by copyright 
owners due to their inability to exercise their copyright for the non-commercial online use of works.  
 
Normally, harm would be measured against the effects of the limitation on the market. But there is no actual 
market to determine accurately the price for the non-commercial use in question. A statutory licence of this 
type applies to public goods or goods not yet released on the market,162 and to forms of use for which there 
is no clear market due to the lack of exercise of the right or its monetisation.163 Therefore, we suggest that 
the harm should be calculated on the basis of a different reference point, namely by assessing the value of 
the uses at issue to the end-users that benefit from the proposed system.  
 
Following our previous research, the harm in question could be determined by measuring users’ willingness 
to pay for such a system through methods of contingent valuation.164 Furthermore, the amount of harm 
should take into consideration mitigating factors already referred in the InfoSoc Directive’s recitals and 
CJEU case law in this field: the de minimis nature of a use, prior payments for such use, or the application 
of technological protection measures. For instance, certain types of use permitted by the exception only 
cause minimal harm or are already compensated through contractual means, i.e. priced into the purchase or 
licence of the digital content uploaded to the content-sharing platform. The result is that such uses do not 
cause economic harm to the copyright holders and may not give rise to an obligation to pay fair 
compensation.165 
 
Naturally, these factors can be developed and additional ones can be devised to assist in the calculation of 
the compensation. An example of an existing factor that can be adjusted to our proposal would be to 
consider as harm-reducing the above-mentioned case of post-upload monetisation of content on the 
platform with the authorisation of right-holders. Additional factors suggested by other authors include the 
nature and operation of a platform, as well as the period of time since the publication of uploaded works.166 
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Finally, we should reiterate that the scope of our proposed exception is linked to that of existing 
unremunerated exceptions, such as quotation, criticism, review, caricature, parody or pastiche.167 If an 
upload by a user falls within the scope of such exceptions, as interpreted by the CJEU, then it will by 
definition give rise to no harm to be compensated under our proposed system.  
 
If our proposal were to be accepted, it would bring with it consequences for the legal admissibility of the 
underlying exception. Harm calculated in the way we suggest would correspond to the “prejudice” suffered 
by copyright-holders due to their inability to exercise and license their rights for the uses under appreciation. 
By securing the payment of such amount as fair compensation, the prejudice would be returned to 
reasonable levels. In so designing the system, we aim to ensure that the exception meets the requirements 
imposed by the last condition of the three-step test.168 This approach would also retain the required link 
between harm and privileged use, while approximating fair compensation to the notion of “appropriate 
reward” to incentivise creativity, thereby fulfilling a declared objective of EU copyright law.169  
3. Payment Obligations and Safeguards for Platforms  
 
Finally, it is possible to identify some high-level features of the basic operation of the proposed statutory 
licence, including payment obligations and safeguards for platforms. The obligation to pay compensation 
would lie with content-sharing platform providers whose users benefit from the exception proposed. These 
providers would be considered “paying agents” or debtors in the context of a statutory licensing system 
managed by a CMO.170 There are valid policy arguments, linked to the promotion of technological 
development, that justify an exclusion for certain smaller, younger and/or less profitable platforms from the 
payment obligation.171 In our view, subject to an impact assessment, it would be justified to consider 
payment exemptions for at least two types of service providers. First, for providers that are start-ups, 
meaning that their services have not been available to the public in the Union for long (e.g. only three or 
five years). This exemption should operate irrespective of the platforms size, user-base and/or audience 
during the period in question. Second, irrespective of their age, an exemption should apply to service 
providers with an annual turnover below a certain threshold.172  
 
The statutory licence would be tied to obligatory collective management of the fair compensation right.173 
Subject to the rules set out in the CRM Directive and implementing legislation, cross-border articulation of 
CMOs could rely on a network of representation agreements of national members to manage and enforce 
the fair compensation right. It is also conceivable that an EU-wide umbrella CMO centralises certain aspects 
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of the system.174 The management of the system and the number of organisations involved would depend 
on the scope and design of the exception(s). As noted, the most efficient design would be that of one 
exception covering two exclusive rights – reproduction and communication to the public – while leaving 
existing exceptions in the acquis intact, and dealing with potential overlaps when calculating fair 
compensation.175  
 
Collection of the rights revenue should be carried out by the competent national CMO directly from the 
content-sharing platform. As regards distribution of compensation, the beneficiaries would be the holders 
of the exclusive rights affected by the exception. Because the right of fair compensation would be 
unwaivable and non-transferable, authors and performers would be entitled to a fair share of the 
distributable rights revenue, with the remaining amount going to other right-holders. In our view, creators 
should be apportioned at least half of the rights revenue collected.176  
 
As noted, our proposal relies on a functioning and mature system of collective rights management.177 
Moreover, such a system would require adaptation to the digital environment so as to apply to content-
sharing platforms. There is therefore an important policy choice to be made as to the scope of application 
of the system that will directly affect the functioning and management of the statutory licence. If the 
objective would be to enable the circulation of works and incentivise collectivised licensing, a possible 
approach would be to accept a broad subject-matter scope for the exception, but to subject payment 
obligations to the existence of a functioning and sufficiently representative CMO in that area, in the 
respective Member State.  
 
As noted, content-sharing platforms are the primary targets of the compensation, however this would lie 
ultimately with the users who benefit from the exception. As with most levy systems, payee platforms 
would have the option to either shift the burden of the compensation to users (e.g. as a subscription fee)178 
or absorb (part of) that cost, for example by financing it out of advertising revenue.179 Where the payment 
of compensation is passed on, platforms should have an obligation to make this transparent to users.  
 
The imposition of the payment obligation should be counterbalanced by the introduction of safeguards for 
content-sharing platforms. We suggest that, following the considerations set out above, the new regime 
should clarify and strengthen the prohibition on the imposition of general monitoring obligations set out in 
Article 15 ECD. Indeed, if a platform does not intend or have knowledge of the infringement; having 
knowledge, does not violate any applicable duty of care; and complies with its payment obligations under 
the proposed statutory licence, it should not be subject to preventive obligations regarding the content it 
hosts. In such a context, platforms should only be subject to obligations to take action against infringing 
content where it can be shown that they intend to cause infringement or after obtaining knowledge of an 
upload that is in violation of the exception. In a world where most of the content uploaded by users would 
be privileged by an exception, such obligations would become less burdensome for platforms. 
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4. Outcome: A Fair, Effective and Future-Proof System 
 
Section C.II argues for the adoption of a statutory licence tied to a mandatory exception for individual 
online users. The exception would cover non-commercial use – reproduction and communication to the 
public (including transformative use) – of works and other subject matter (with the possible exception of 
software, databases and videogames) previously uploaded legally on content-sharing platforms, whether or 
not these are for-profit. The system would encompass the vast majority of end-user activities that normally 
take place on these platforms. The exception would be coupled with an unwaivable right of fair 
compensation to the benefit of creators and other right-holders, with a fair and appropriate share of rights 
revenue to be distributed to authors and performers. The obligation to pay compensation would lie with the 
(non-exempted) platform providers whose users benefit from the exception. This would happen through a 
statutory licensing system managed by a CMO. In return, the legal system would be clarified so as to avoid 
the imposition of monitoring and filtering obligations on such platforms and their users. The design of the 
system and the fair compensation right tied to the exception would ensure its compatibility with the three-
step test, at least if the test is interpreted flexibly.180 
 
This solution would serve as a complement to the harmonised knowledge/intention-based accessory 
liability regime for copyright sketched out in Section C.I. It would thus step in to ensure income for creators 
where the rules of liability reach their practical or legal limits. In this way, providers would be called upon 
to contribute financially to the creativity displayed on their platforms. Conversely, where the new exception 
would not apply – most obviously, in cases of commercial use of protected works – or where the platform 
refuses to cooperate, the liability system would intervene. No fair compensation would be generated, but 
right-holders would be able to exercise their exclusive rights against those engaging in infringement – 
including, where their conduct and mental involvement justifies this, Internet intermediaries. If 
intermediaries cannot be held liable themselves, the system would ensure that, following notification of the 
infringement, they may be obliged to take proportionate action to remove or prevent the infringement.  
 
The anticipated effect of the combined adoption of these two mechanisms would allow breathing space for 
online platforms to conduct their business and innovate, while also adding a novel revenue stream for right-
holders – especially for creators – and focusing enforcement measures on bad-faith platforms that foster 
large-scale infringement. Users and the public in general would benefit from a rich and diverse online 
ecosystem, where the risks of content censorship and enforcement in the private sphere are diminished, but 
possibilities for online enjoyment, expression and creation are promoted. Our proposal could thus bridge 




Current EU copyright law is broken, at least insofar as it applies to mass scale online use. In an attempt to 
update and fix the legal framework, the new DSM Directive includes a so-called “value gap” provision in 
Article 17, aimed at enhancing the responsibility of certain user-upload content-sharing platforms. This 
provision imposes obligations that risk incompatibility with existing law and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. The result, we fear, will be increased legal uncertainty and a legal regime that is more 
prone to chilling, rather than fostering, innovation. We argue that a fundamental problem with Article 17 is 
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that is misunderstands the real challenge with which EU copyright law struggles, i.e. the proliferation of 
copyright infringement online in general, resulting from highly complex and fragmented rules on both 
primary and accessory copyright infringement.  
 
There are no perfect solutions to this challenge. Any new proposal will have to be built on top of a highly 
complex legal framework. Its benefits and drawbacks should be measured not against an ideal system, but 
the current “value gap” provision and its potential impact on the acquis.  
 
In light of these constraints, we advance a pragmatic alternative for fixing EU copyright law through the 
parallel implementation of two legal mechanisms. The first consists of the adoption of a harmonised EU 
framework for accessory liability for third party copyright and related rights infringement, capable of 
determining, among others, when an intermediary – including content-sharing platforms – should be held 
liable for its users’ infringements. The second is an alternative compensation system for right-holders 
covering non-commercial online use by individuals in the context of user-upload platforms. This entails the 
adoption of a mandatory exception and fair compensation right in the context of a statutory licensing 
system.  
 
Our solution, like most levy-based systems, undoubtedly represents a “rough justice” response to a real 
world problem.181 However, when properly calibrated along the lines suggested in this article, such an 
approach could contribute to achieving the “fair balance” between the rights and interests of right-holders 
and users that the CJEU places at the heart of EU copyright law and to which Article 17 only pays lip 
service. The joint operation of the two proposed mechanisms would increase legal certainty for all 
stakeholders, enable the development of the information society, and provide fair compensation for right-
holders for uses of their works in the online environment.  
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